SHERIFF v. GORDON, 96 Nev. 205 (1980)

606 P.2d 533

No. 12398Supreme Court of Nevada.
February 21, 1980

Appeal from Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Paul S. Goldman, Judge.

Richard H. Bryan, Attorney General, Carson City; Robert J. Miller, District Attorney, and Gregory C. Diamond, Deputy District Attorney, Clark County, for Appellant.

Alan B. Andrews, Las Vegas, for Respondent.

OPINION
Per Curiam:

The Clark County Grand Jury returned an indictment charging respondent Terry Gordon with pandering, a felony. See NRS 201.300.[1] Gordon subsequently petitioned the district

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court for a writ of habeas corpus contending, among other things, that the indictment was not supported by sufficient evidence because the incriminating testimony lacked required corroboration. The district court agreed and granted the petition. This appeal followed.

Testimony upon which the indictment was based was provided by Sara Blair, a prostitute, and her husband, Carl. Sara and Carl testified that they initiated a meeting with Gordon in order to seek advice on improving “our business.”[2] Gordon allegedly agreed to “[set her] up in the escort business” in exchange for a percentage of the fees Sara would receive for the services she provided as a prostitute.

The indictment charged Gordon with inveigling or enticing Sara to become, or continue to be, a prostitute. In his petition, Gordon argued that the indictment must be dismissed because Sara’s testimony was not corroborated as required by NRS 175.301,[3] and Carl’s testimony was not corroborated as required by NRS 175.291.[4] The state conceded that the testimony of Carl, who would be an accomplice of Gordon under the facts of this case, required corroboration under NRS 175.291, but argued that his testimony was in fact corroborated by Sara’s. We do not agree.

Gordon may not be tried on the pandering charge if the indictment is supported only by the uncorroborated testimony of Sara, the person upon whom the offense was allegedly committed, State v. Wyatt, 84 Nev. 731, 448 P.2d 827 (1968), or the uncorroborated accomplice testimony of Carl. Ex Parte Hutchinson, 76 Nev. 478, 357 P.2d 589 (1960). Nor may the indictment be sustained by the combined testimony of Sara and Carl. Witnesses whose testimony requires corroboration may not

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corroborate each other. See LaPena v. State, 92 Nev. 1, 13, 544 P.2d 1187, 1195 (1976) (GUNDERSON, C.J., dissenting). See also
People v. Tewksbury, 544 P.2d 1335 (Cal. 1976), appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 805 (1976); Howard v. Commonwealth, 487 S.W.2d 689 (Ky. 1972); People v. Chamberlain, 329 N.Y.S.2d 61
(Sup.Ct.App. Div. 1972); Commonwealth v. Jones, 247 A.2d 624
(Pa.Super. 1968). But see People v. Martinez, 531 P.2d 964
(Colo. 1975); Jones v. State, 218 S.E.2d 899 (Ga. 1975).

Accordingly, since the incriminating testimony supporting the indictment lacked the necessary corroboration, the district court properly granted Gordon’s habeas petition. Cf. LaPena v. State, 96 Nev. 43, 604 P.2d 811 (1980); LaPena v. Sheriff, 91 Nev. 692, 541 P.2d 907 (1975).

Affirmed.